The Crisis: Euro, Hungary, Greece, Italy

An interview Lucia Najslova did with me on topics such as the Eurocrisis, the Orbán government, Greece, Italy, the European integrations process. It appears in Zahranicna Politika in Slovak.


After the recent (Dec 9) summit, Hungarian government expressed reluctance in supporting deeper fiscal integration. Why?


According to what we know so far, this is a bad treaty. It does not solve the eurozone crisis in any way, but undemocratically limits the legitimacy of the fiscal process.


Does Hungary have alternative proposals?


Hungary? Orbán talks about deep going reforms to the eurozone, but no one has yet bothered to ask him what he means by it.


What about Hungary & joining eurozone?


No date set.

Is there a debate on this issue?

It would be a joke to even dream of it in the present economic situation. Hungary is on the verge of a sovereign debt default.

Which brings us to the negotiations with the IMF and the European Commission. Both left the table recently, arguing they will not lend to Hungary if its central bank's independence is under threat from government.

The independence of central banks is a fiction. Governments appoint Chairmen, Monetary Council members, etc. It is only that their terms are set apart from the terms of governments, which the current Hungarian government wants to upset.

Sure, why do then EC&IMF criticize the new law?

Chiefly because it goes against THEIR understanding of the independence of central bank, and it threatens those who implement their versions of monetary policy. i.e. the incumbent Hungarian policymakers.

Can you elaborate a bit where you see the problem of their version?

They want to target inflation. Which is wrong, because it is growth that should receive priority. It is also wrong methodologically, because the Central Bank cannot state for certain why the inflation rate remains so high in Hungary, as opposed elsewhere in the region.

How should they support growth?

By gradual lowering of interest rates. I have to add, that at this point this becomes impossible due to the horrible EUR HUF exchange rate, since lowering central bank indicative rates would send the EURHUF rate through the roof. But such a change of policy would have been possible in past years. So the government is pushing at the wrong time.

What would be the best thing for the government to do now?

Push the central bank issue at a later point, and concentrate on a credible budgetary alternative with the goal to avoid having to take the IMF loan.

Would that mean spending cuts?

Never. Spending cuts NEVER make sense in NO SITUATION in NO COUNTRY.

How do we stimulate growth without borrowing and cutting spending?

Spending cuts lead to a fall in demand, which leads to a worse economic situation, which leads to more cuts..etc. Economic hardships should be used to, firstly, restructure tax revenues and secondly, to reform expenditure.

This is what Joseph Stiglitz is saying - that Europe fought with wrong tools & austerity is not the answer. How should then Hungary redirect its expenses?

Cut the possibility to avoid taxes through offshoring, reintroduce a progressive private income tax, reintroduce inheritance tax, introduce loads of taxes on environmental pollution. It should increase spending on education, education, education. And employment systems, anti-corruption, tax agency.

Would that mean bigger taxes for corporations, for man on the street/employee or both?

Bigger taxes for large corporations and owners of capital. Especially the ones who have been avoiding taxes. Lower taxes for domestic small and medium enterprises. When it comes to individuals, it would mean higher taxes for the rich.

Why hasn't the Hungarian government taken up such measures yet?

Because their policy has been to "boost the upper middle class". The only problem is that there is no upper middle class in Hungary.

Coming back to Stiglitz, he as well suggests that in present shape eurozone cannot save itself. Two reasons - lack of central fiscal authority plus low mobility. Can we have one European currency & economic zone without one finance ministry?

A central fiscal authority would have been nice at Maastricht in 1992. But Europe did not want it. It would have required elections at the Commission level. Member states never wanted that. And now it would even be too late. Italy needs refinancing today, not fiscal monitoring tomorrow. So peeping into the Italian budget from a nonelected Commission that derives from member states is in NO WAY better than the member state itself.

Most integration measures in Europe were not introduced because member states "wanted" them, but because it was the least bad option.

But most crucial ones have been blocked by one or more member state for decades. For instance, they never introduced a real political union, only a free trade based EU.

Do you feel than that deeper integration is not happening as a response to the crisis? That the treaty will be buried?

There have been 21 summit meeting in 14 months. After each one they claimed to have had a breakthrough. Yet things get worse and the average European is not even keeping an eye on these bullshit meetings any more.

Yes, the Europeans are either resigned or just angry. But should we then proceed only by saving the burning cases like Greece and Italy? Isn't the crisis a sign that the EMU stands on weak pillars?

It is time to face reality. The EMU was stillborn, and needs to be rolled back somehow. As Robert Mundell wrote in 1968, and this was repeatedly mentioned in the debate around Maastricht, you cannot have a common currency for an unoptimal currency area.

What did he mean by unoptimal?

Where there are high and low growth countries, there is no good common interest rate.

Would eurozone then make sense for countries with similar cycles of growth? Or do you argue for total abandonment of euro?

The central bank will always keep interest rates low for those countries with no growth, and will therefore fuel bubbles in the high growth ones: Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal. If you could guarantee that economic cycles align in all states, you could have them in a Eurozone. Otherwise it is a nice but detrimental dream.

Well, let’s imagine we'll say goodbye to euro. What could be the impact on the free market?

The free market is the other reason why countries like Greece suffered. They completely deindustrialised after 1981, their EC entry, after decades of 7-9% growth under protectionism. So when the euro came with low interest rates, they bought from the Germans, because they could not produce anything.

Still – what would be the impact of eurozone's dissolution on free market?

There would most likely be more of a reluctance to trade. So free trade would diminish. But it would not be a tragedy. Free trade as a dogma need to be rethought just as much as monetary integration. It is not necessarily equally beneficial for all. It is time to face reality.

And now Germans are basically saving themselves – i.e. state investments, not the banks. So they cannot let Greece fall, right?

Exactly.

But then, following the reports from Greece, it does not seem that the bailout has helped.
People are facing new and new austerity measures + they read about how the other Europeans are angry that they have to send them some money.

Greece has had 5 waves of fiscal stabilisations in 25 years. They only led to fruther fiscal stabilisations. In Slovakia, Sulik is right. And I don't often say that about him.

So, in your view the stability mechanism is a bluff.

Yes.

Why does then everybody support it with exceptions like Sulik and why has it become such a symbol of "Europeanness"?

For a number of reasons. First, it lets the Commission ignore the fact that the Eurozone was stillborn. Second, it would have made sense at Maastricht, but only with democratic legitimation. The EU has long given up on any need for democratic legitimation. Finally, the mainstream consensus is the stupid one that the PIIGS were to blame. That they were irresponsible.

After Sulik said "no", the Slovak papers were full of commentaries that he is not 'European enough" and various Slovak elites have expressed fear that when they will travel to Brussels now, they will have to feel ashamed.

Eastern European elites understand very little of European integration. They have these superficial tribelike mentalities of being the best pupil.

Well, PIIGS might have had creative accounting, but we are speaking of big German and French investments...so they either overlooked problems in Pigs or they just exploited the situation without thinking of tomorrow?

PIIGS were helped in their creative accounting by the same firm that Mr. Monti, Draghi and Papademos worked for, Goldman Sachs.


So it is the vicious circle of face-saving for everyone

Pretty much. Without having to have real democracy at the federal level, and having to get rid of the stillborn euro, the detrimental free trade arrangement, or the offshore tax havens.

Would you then suggest that Greece undergoes supervised bankruptcy?

Greece is already undergoing supervised bankruptcy.

Would the same scenario work for Italy, a much bigger economy?

No. We would need four times the money we have painfully horded together in the ESFS.

Will Italy then undergo a 'spontaneous' bankruptcy?

Unless we introduce the eurobonds, yes.

What is the major factor preventing us from their introduction?

Angela Merkel.

Why does Merkel say it is not in their interest?

It would increase the German borrowing rate.

In the short term. But in the long run it might stabilise economies, no?

Yes.. but in a crisis, when the market threatens you, you tend to think in a short-term perspective. Germany has already experienced a surprise increase on its government bond rate.

The expression "markets are scared" or "markets threaten you" has been used so many times in the debate on crisis. Who are these markets?

Investors who buy government bonds or your currency, or your company shares.

And why do you have to abide by their 'threats' when in the end they are dependent on government regulations. Moreover, in a simplistic explanation - the very essence of market is that in many transactions someone looses and someone gains - so, the 'markets' do not act like 1 person, do they?


They do not threaten you. They simply refuse to buy you bonds. Who will finance you then?

Sure, government is as well dependent on them, just like they depend on government

They do not depend on the government.

Well, government & parliament regulate the environment in which markets/investors function.

Governments can regulate the markets. But it is not a question of regulation whether you decide to invest in something or not. It is an independent decision.

So, what would the eurobonds bring?

Eurobonds would mean a transitory period of peace for the EU as whole, and somewhat higher refinancing rates for the Germans.

Let’s look at the issue that you have mentioned several times – democratic legitimacy in Europe. Can European governance be legitimate unless we become a federation?

The European Commission is composed of delegates from the member states, and is financed from national contributions. It is therefore dependent and controlled by member states. The European Parliament has its strongest powers in the co-decision procedure, but even there the Council can veto it. And finally in the Council any state has de facto veto power even after Lisbon, and in many important cases even de jure veto power.

Yes, so, the EU as it is now is legitimate? Just because member states have veto?

The EU is essentially still an intergovernmental organisation, run by the Member states. The next question to ask is: who controls the member state governments?

European governments are often composed of parties that got votes of minority of population.
Plus, you have Europeans who would be happier to vote for a representative of another member state since they are not happy with the menu presented at home

That is not the main issue in my opinion. The main issue is that European governments are made up of parties that had been intransparently financed by big business in the elections, who expect something back.

Yes, business influence is certainly relevant consideration the new "99 percent" party in Slovakia
is (quite cynically) financed by people from arms industry. But, how can we overcome the influence of big business on politics?

1. One party campaign donations account nationwide. 2. One party campaign expenditure account nationwide. 3. Ban on any business entity financing political parties. 4. Private individuals should only donate to the degree of the price of one single television set. 5. No political ads in national media.

Great idea. And this law would have to be adopted by - parliament. Which is composed of.... etc.

Parties that run on THIS platform. And they gain popular support.

Is there a country where this already works?

Several. Belgium, Netherlands, etc In Sweden even personal income tax returns are in the public domain...

Perhaps here the Commission could show its usefulness and propose a directive to apply these rules to all countries

The Commission is a captive of the member states, who are in turn captives of big business.

It worked with anti-discrimination directive but then, there was no money involved, 'just' human rights

Barroso is a former Maoist who turned conservative, and then a promoter of genetically modified potato.

Back to European governance. Can you imagine that Europe would have a joined federal government composed on the basis of results of elections to European parliament
in which European citizens would not have to choose only from national nominees?

There should be Europe-wide elections with pan-European parties for the EP. There should be Europe-wide elections WITH SEVERAL CANDIDATES for the Commission. (Leonhid Barroso was elected from ONE candidate. 3. The post of the Council President should be scrapped, it is totally redundant, and only serves to confuse. (He was elected from NO candidates! Noone volunteered their name on the morning when Rompuy was elected!).

Is that possible without panEuropean media ? Who watches Euronews? The only pan-European medium is BBC and we know the UK's European thoughts..

This is the other way around. EU institutions do not matter, so Europeans do not read/watch them...

Or journalists are not able to show cases where EU institutions do matter..

Also, yes.

As a Hungarian citizen, are you glad that Hungary was not ready to adopt euro earlier?
Or, does it matter?

It does not matter. Countries that are fiscally sound, like Slovakia, do NOT need the euro. Countries that are fiscally unsound, like Hungary, would need it, but would never achieve it.

What makes SVK fiscally sound? Our expenditures to relevant sectors -i.e. education are a joke.

The Dzurinda government opened up to FDI inflow exactly at the time when the inflow of FDI had the post transition reconstruction effect of bringing in more revenues, while they also radically cut expenditure to live up the future of Slovakia. Fiscally sound in this narrow sense only means BALANCED. It does not mean that the allocative, redistributive or regulatory roles pf the budget are OK as well.

FDI's are in short term irrefutable - but, if we look at what type of labor is requested in many of the newly opened factories it does not really contribute to development of significant added value

Low wage, low value added, unsustainable. Dzurinda admitted that much after having lost the election to Fico.

Requiem for Slovak government?!?

I have never been a fan of Sulik and his neoliberal SAS party, but this time around he acted responsibly. Wasting Slovak taxpayers' money on the Eurozone that is going to collapse withing months is just irresponsible. The likelyhood of Greece falling is 98%. If Greece collapse, so will Spain and Italy, who are a prayer away from bailout level refinancing rates for their debt. And the ESFS and the ECB have no money to bail them out. Therefore Sulik was responsible. Maybe he did blackmail the government, but it was Radicova who decided to make this vote a vote of confidence, not him. And you cannot go around justfying the continued existence of a government just because you are always afraid of Fico-the-Antichrist. You cannot base a democratic political system on this. One last thing: the Radicova government failed utterly in the most crucial thing needed by Slovakia. That would have been a reform of the educational system. With Radicova having come from academia, they never even tried. No requiem for her government, sorry.

Economic situation in Hungary after the elections

While an economic wunderkind in the nineties, Hungary has featured amongst the basket cases in the European Union in recent years, along with the likes of Greece, Lithuania and Romania. The previous, Socialist led government was responsible for the worst mismanagement of any economy in post transition Europe, resulting in a record high budget deficit on top of an already high national debt. This swept Hungary to the edge of sovereign default, with the IMF having to step in and provide an emergency standby loan as market interest rates of refinancing the country’s debt suddenly became unrealistically high in the wake of the international financial crisis and the disappearance of liquidity from international financial markets. Citizens became dramatically disappointed with the government, in spite of a change of prime minister and a drastic stabilisation programme in the final year of an eight year, two term rule, which decreased the hole in the national budget from above ten per cent of GDP to below four per cent, an achievement that is now being held up by international financial institutions to other austerity economies such as Greece or Spain. This helped little to calm anger and frustration, and at the national parliamentary elections in early 2010 the Socialists were reduced to a small party of 17 percent, while their main rivals, the centre right Fidesz party won a landslide victory with a whopping 67 per cent of votes cast.
The vote was primarily a protest vote, little was known about the future economic policies of Fidesz during the elections. The lack of information the party itself gave rise to wide ranging speculation, which continued for weeks even after the formation of the new government under Viktor Orbán, who had already governed once between 1998 and 2002. The fog cleared somewhat in the middle of the summer, once again as a consequence of pressure from the international financial markets. Leading members of the Fidesz party gave a series of statements to the press about “corpses” in the budget they inherited from the previous government, hinting that the annual deficit might be much higher again, than expected. It seems likely that these unfortunate pronouncements were only a concerted attempt to create more fiscal room for the policies of the new government, but they did not go down well with international investors. The forint took a dive, and the government had to backtrack and calm sentiments by making it very clear that they intend to stick to the original 3.8 per cent deficit target, as planned by their predecessors. They also held a three day emergency session, after which Prime Minister Orbán addressed parliament to outline a rather eclectic mix of 29 points that included everything from releasing the ban on distilling pálinka (gin) to a complete overhaul of the tax system. The major thrust of the package was the reduction of the tax burden on small, primarily Hungarian owned enterprises (through a second, lower rate of corporate tax) and middle class earners (through a single rate personal income tax), while increasing the tax burden of low earners and banks, including a special tax on financial institutions. With this, Hungary essentially joined the low flat rate tax competition that had swept across Central and Eastern Europe in previous years, started by Slovakia and followed up by Romania, Bulgaria and others. The interesting experiment of the new Orbán government is aimed at trying to alleviate the dramatically low employment rate of the country, at 54 per cent, ten percentage points lower than the EU average, through decreasing the tax wedge on labour. Whether this will work with Hungarians who have now been out of work for two decades, and have lost their skills and motivation, is an open question. However, by introducing the special bank tax, which is meant to counterbalance the immediate loss in government revenues from labour related taxes, Orbán has indirectly admitted that he no longer believes that tax reduction will be self financing through an increase in employment. Another indication of this is the fact that he is only willing to set employment targets for a ten year period, way after his current mandate, by which time he foresees one million new jobs created.
The introduction of the special financial task, amongst other issues, has lead to a deadlock in the negotiations with the IMF for the extension of the current standby loan, which will expire in October. Orbán then stepped in to declare that Hungary no longer needs the assistance of the IMF, and will be able to refinance its debt from the international markets. This certainly seems possible for the next two years, but from 2013 repayments of former debts will increase dramatically, coupled by repayments on the current IMF loan. Whether Hungary will have stabilised its economy and started on the path to high growth by then is anyone’s guess in the current turbulent international economic environment.


(This article appeared in Hospodarske Noviny in Czech)

A magyarok nyelvtudása

A leértékeléssel illetve adócsökkentéssel versenyképességet elérni igyekvő polgártársaimnak. (Kattints az ábrára nagyításért.)

Kommentár nem szükséges.

Hungarians in Romania no longer more prosperous

For decades it has been widely believed that Hungarians in Romania are more prosperous than the rest of the country. This no longer seems to be the case.

Hungarians in Romania live predominantly in Transylvania, although there is a considerably non-historical minority in Bucharest, who have moved there predominantly because of administrative occupations in the capital.

Hungarians form a large majority of the population in the counties of Harghita (84.6%) and Covasna (73.79%), and a large percentage in Mures (39.3%), Satu Mare (35.22%), Bihor (25.91%), Salaj (23.07%), Cluj (17.4%) and Arad (10.70%) counties.

Within Transylvania, Hungarians cluster around the Hungarian border region, as well as deep within Transylvania, in a non-official area generally referred to as Szeklerland.

The 1998 Green Paper on regional development in Romania placed counties on a six scale index according to their global level of development (1-worst, 6-best). In Szeklerland, Covasna and Harghita were level 4, Mures was level 5. In the border region Satu Mare was 4, Bihor was 5. In the two counties with a relatively smaller number of Hungarians Cluj was 6, top, but Salaj was only 3, below average.

The GDP/per head of Romania was 344650,6/ 21537563= 0.01601 million lei at 2008 prices in 2006. For the Szeklerland it was Covasna 2779,7/223364=0.01244, Harghita 4464,5/325611=0.0137, and Mures 8174,1/581759=0.0141. Thus this whole region is well below the national average. As for the other partially Hungarian counties Bihor 9475,4/594232=0.0159, Cluj 13558,6/692316=0.0196, Satu Mare 4699,7/366270=0.0129, and Salaj 3054,0/243257=0-01255. Thus with the exception of county Cluj, all other counties are well below the national average. (Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Office.)

In 2007, unemployment in all of Romania was 4% (Romanian Statistical Office). The same indicator in the Szeklerland was 7% in Covasna, 5.1% in Harghita, 4.3% in Mures. Altogether this is worse than the national average. In the other counties: Bihor 2.4%, Satu Mare 2.6%, Salaj 4.4%, Cluj 3%, altogether better than the national average.

The dependency ratio (employed person per total population) for all of Romania is 4885319/21537563=23%. For the Szeklerland it was Covasna 49788/223364=22%, Harghita 64401/325611=20%, and Mures 127953/581759=22%. Thus this region is only slightly below average. As for the other partially Hungarian counties Bihor 163325/594232=27%, Cluj 194239/692316=28%, Satu Mare 75246/366270=21, and Salaj 46343/243257=19%. Thus this shows a mixed picture. The figures for Bihor and Cluj are most likely inflated by the cities of Oradea and Cluj, where Hungarians make up 28% and 19% respectively. Thus Hungarians are slightly overrepresented in these cities! (Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Office)

As for income, the whole of Romanian averaged 1396 lei gross and 1042 lei net per month in 2007. Average monthly income in the Szeklerland was 1036/792 in Covasna, 1081/814 in Harghita, and 1265/950 in Mures, all significantly lower. On the other counties it was 1086/811 in Bihor, 1489/1113 in Cluj, 1171/896 in Satu Mare and 1208/920 in Salaj. Thus in this non-core region only CLuj had higher than average earnings, where the percentage of Hungarians is the lowest.

In summary it can therefore be stated that the core regions of the Hungarian ethnic group in Romania, the Szeklerland, is well below Romanian average. So are the other areas where Hungarians form a considerable minority, with the single exception of Cluj county, whose figures are largely determined by the high significance of the city of Cluj in the Romanian economy.

Neoliberálisok képviselhetik a magyarokat Szlovákiában?

A hazai sajtó a szlovákiai választások nyomán arra a tényre koncentrál, hogy a Fidesz elsietett kettős állampolgárságos döntése nyomán klienspártja, a Magyar Koalíció kiesett a pozsonyi parlamentből. Szinte egyáltalán nem foglalkozik azzal a kérdéssel, hogy milyen profilú párt is a nemrégiben alapított "Híd-Most", amely közel 8%-ot megszerezve innentől fogva egyedüliként fogja képviselni a szlovákiai magyarokat a törvényhozásban.
Pedig nem érdektelen ezt közelebbről megvizsgálni. A párt vezetője és poszterszemélyisége a liberális nemzetpolitikai karaktere miatt a szlovákok körében is népszerű Bugár Béla, akinek határozott gazdaságpolitikai arcéle nincsen. 7 magyar és 7 szlovák képviselőt küldenek majd az országgyűlésbe. Alelnöke az az Ivan Svejna aki a szlovák Hayek társaság társelnöke, a nemzetközi neoliberális Mont Pellerin társaság tagja.

A Híd-Most legközelebbi szövetségese Richard Sulik neoliberális pártja, a szintén nem olyan régen alakult Szabadság és Szolidaritás (SaS). Sulik maga a szlovák egykulcsos adó kitalálójának tartja magát (erre a címre többen pályáznak). A magyar közbeszédben sikeresnek hitt szlovák egykulcsos adó hátulütőiről már írtunk itt és itt. A párt EP listáját a Hayek Alapítvány másik vezetője, Martin Chren vezette.

Pozsonyi pletykák szerint a két párt vezetője a választás éjszakáján is együtt ünnepelt, borozott, szivarozott. Úgy néz ki tehát, hogy a szlovákiai magyaroknak neoliberális képviselete lesz a következő szlovák kormányban és parlamentben.

A görög válságról

BAJBAN AZ EUROZÓNA
Komoly bajban van az eurozóna. Bebizonyosodott az, amit a kritikusok végig mondogattak, hogy a hatvanas évektől létező optimális valutaövezeti modell ellenére egy olyan valutaövezetet hoztak létre, amelyik egyáltalán nem optimális. Ráadásul a valutaövezeti irodalom intései ellenére nem készültek fel egy válság, vagy az egyes tagállamokat jobban érintő gazdasági sokkok kezelésére. Azazhogy a monetáris unióhoz a fiskális oldal összehangolása, adott esetben komoly belső transzferek szükségeltetnek.
Senki ne gondolja, hogy az övezetbe való belépéskor történt csalásokat csak a görögök nyakába lehet varrni. A költségvetési elszámolás szabályait maga az Eurostat hozta létre. Ha nem vették észre a görögök manipulációit, akkor az az ő felelősségük. Ha észrevették, és együttműködtek, az is. Az utóbbit valószínűsíti, hogy ismert módon már a kilencvenes években is együttműködtek egyes alapító tagállamok (Olaszország, Portugália, Belgium) eurozónába „tuszkolásában”. Az euró politikai projektként túl fontos volt ahhoz, hogy a gazdasági racionalitás prudens keretek közé szorítsa.

MI OKOZTA A VÁLSÁGOT?
Nagyon érdekes, hogy a viták szinte teljességükben a nemzetközi mentési akcióra fókuszálnak. Szinte senki nem teszi fel az alapkérdést, hogy mért alakult ki a válság Görögországban? Lehetett volna-e megelőzni? Megismétlődhet-e máshol?
A görög, portugál és egyéb valutaövezeti tagok problémái ugyanis felvetik a valutaövezet alapját adó egységes belső piac működésének kérdését is. Az EU déli perifériája mióta a nyolcvanas években belépett, egyfolytában versenyképességi problémákkal küzd az egységes piacon belül. A kétezres években, az eurozóna tagjaként ez a periféria minden addig látottnál alacsonyabb kamatszinteken jutott tőkéhez, amely egyfajta befektetési boomot okozott a térségben. Görögországban mindezt megfejelte még egy olimpia is, amely extra lökést adott a gazdaságnak. A konjunktúra és a kedvező világgazdasági környezet minden eddiginél nagyobb, 40-60%-os reálbér növekedést eredményezett a déli periférián. A bérek növekedése a fogyasztás megugrásával és a háztartások eladósodásával járt együtt. Ezt a hatalmas bérkiáramlást pedig nem követte a termelékenység növekedése, azaz a mediterrán országok jelentős versenyképességi hátrányba kerültek Németországgal szemben. A német exportgépezet óriási többletet halmozott fel az egységes belső piacon belül. Ennek az egyik oka az volt, hogy a németek öndiagnózisa a túl magas bér volt, amelyet a nagyon lassú termelékenységi növekményüknél nem gyorsabb, visszafogott bérkiáramlással orvosoltak. Azaz amíg a déliek egy egységnyi termékre jutó bérköltsége meredeken emelkedett, a németeké stagnált. Ráadásul a német cégek bérköltségei még avval is csökkentek, hogy az alacsony bérszintű kelet-európai új tagállamokat belefoglalták nemzetközi termelési láncaikba. Az így megtermelt tőkét pedig Németország visszaforgatta közvetlen működő tőke és banki hitelek formájában délre, különösen az után, hogy a kelet-európai hitelezés a válság kirobbanta után bedőlt. (Amikor tehát a németek, franciák és mások Görögországot mentik, tulajdonképpen a saját bankjaikat is mentik.)
A dolog érdekessége, hogy Görögország tulajdonképpen sikeres felzárkózásban is lehetett volna a 2000-es években. A termelékenység emelkedése például magasabb volt, mint Németországban, azaz ha türelmesebb módon egy lassabb bérnövekménnyel is megelégednek a görögök, akkor szép nyugodt és fenntartható felzárkózásban lettek volna.

NEM AZ ÁLLAM TEHET RÓLA
Nem igaz ugyanis, hogy a görög állam tehetne a krízisről. A görög állam akkor sem nagy, ha minden negyedik görög az államnak dolgozik. Az állam kiadásai a 2000-es években mindvégig a GDP 45%-a körül voltak, a német kiadási méret alatt. Az állam bruttó adóssága 2000 után folyamatosan csökkenőben volt a nemzetközi gazdasági válság kirobbanásáig, csakis azután nőtt meg a hirtelen hatalmasra ugró költségvetési hiány következtében, illetve amikor a négy legnagyobb görög bank állami segítséget kért. A megugró bérkiáramlásra a magánszektorban, illetve a háztartások hitelfelvételi boomjára a görög államnak csak igen korlátozottan lett volna ráhatása.

GÖRÖG KULTÚRA?
Az sem teljesen igaz, hogy a görög válság a gyarló, dőzsölő és korrupt görög kultúra eredménye. Itt érdemes tenni egy összehasonlítást Ciprussal, amely gyakorlatilag egy másik görög köztársaság. Míg a görögök régóta ismert módon problémásak, Ciprus érdekes módon az az ország volt, amely EU-n kívüli országként is mindvégig megfelelt volna az eurót meghatározó, 1992-ben meghatározott maastrichti kritériumok mindegyikének. Erre az unión belül egyetlen ország sem volt képes. Azaz a kulturális meghatározottság mítosz. A két ország között jelentős különbség, hogy míg Ciprus gyakorlatilag adóparadicsomként működik az EU-n belül is, addig Görögországban a gazdasági elit legjava, a nagyvállalkozók igen gyakran nem adóznak, az országon kívüli kedvezőbb adóztatású paradicsomokban – többek között Cipruson - tartják pénzüket.

A MEGOLDÁSRÓL
Mi lesz a görög válság kimenetele? Nos ennek egyik oldala a mentőcsomag, másik pedig a görög kormány tettei. Ismert módon az eurozóna tagjai az eredeti szerződések explicit tiltásai ellenére is áthidaló segítséget nyújtanak Görögországnak. Természetesen a segítség jelentős része a Görögországban kitett, főleg német és francia bankok megsegítését célozza, illetve annak elkerülését, hogy a többi dél-európai ország, és ezen keresztül az eurozóna is bedőljön. Ez középtávon elégségesnek bizonyulhat, ám nem oldja meg a problémákat. Az 5%-on felvett hitel ugyanis kedvezőbb természetesen a vállalhatatlan piaci alternatívánál, de a jelenlegi államháztartási hiány és GDP csökkenési cél mellett is azt jelenti, hogy Görögország GDP-hez mért államadóssága minden valószínűség szerint 150% körülire nő a jövő év közepére. Márpedig kevesen tudják, hogy a külső adósság újrafinanszírozása szempontjából 2010 kevésbé veszélyes év, mint lesz 2011.
Mindehhez hozzájárulhat az, hogy Papandreou kormány által kényszerűen vállalt megszorítások nem hogy nem fognak a gazdasági növekedés újraéledéséhez vezetni. Természetesen helyes dolog az állami alkalmazottak és a nyugdíjasok mindenfajta 13. és 14. Havi juttatását megszüntetni, ám a köztisztviselők bérbefagyasztása maximum a munkamorál csökkenését eredményezheti (gyenge kényszerlépés, hiszen a magánszektor bérkiáramlására a kormánynak nem lehet ráhatása). A ÁFA és a jövedéki adók emelése hozzájárulhat az egyensúly visszaállításához, de a gazdasági növekedést visszafoghatja. És mindezzel együtt is csak -9% körül tartunk, honnan lesz itt egyensúly közeli állapot? És akkor még nem beszéltünk sztrájkokról, demonstrációkról, a leblokkolt államról…

KI A KÖVETKEZŐ?
Spanyolország teljes adóssága 342%, ezen belül az állam 47%, de ebből csak 27% van külföldön. Olaszország teljes adóssága 298%, ebből 101% az állam, és ennek 56%-a van külföldön. Azaz a két nagyobb ország közül messze Olaszország a kitettebb. A jóval kisebb Portugália államadósságának szintén 60%-a külföldön van. (Görögországban a 230-ból 120% körüli államadósság 99%-a külföldön van.) Olaszország likviditási szükséglete is sokkal nagyobb a 2010es évben. Egyértelműen Olaszország a legkitettebb….